When Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke from the ramparts of Red Fort about his aspiration for India to develop its own jet engine, his words echoed a deep-seated pain—a frustration of over four decades in the making.
Since the ambitious launch of the Kaveri engine programme in 1986, India has faced repeated setbacks— lost decades, wasted resources and unfulfilled national ambitions.
There is now some momentum to change that. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has said at ET World Leaders Forum that India’s indigenously built fifth-generation fighter aircraft will have indigenously built engines. The plan is to jointly develop them with the French company Safran.
About time too. Originally slated for completion in 1996, the Kaveri project remains unfinished, with its objectives frequently shifting toward secondary applications rather than its initial purpose.
The cost escalation is staggering. What began with an allocation of Rs 382 crore in 1986 ballooned to more than Rs 1,300 crore by 2004, surpassed Rs 2,000 crore by 2014, and officially totalled Rs 2,839 crore by 2016—as acknowledged by the then defence minister Manohar Parrikar in the Lok Sabha. Today, it is estimated that over Rs 3,000 crore has been invested, yet India remains without a homegrown operational engine for its fighter aircraft.
Jet engine is the heart of any aircraft as its mission and performance hinge on this singular technology. Despite years of relentless effort from the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and its Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE),
India has not produced an engine capable of powering its own Tejas multirole aircraft. Our inability to deliver on this promise has not only resulted in prolonged delays but has also dealt a serious blow to national security. There are various factors that contributed to the programme’s persistent failures.
LIMITED EXPERIENCE
When GTRE received the mandate to build an advanced jet engine, its prior experience was minimal. Though it developed the GTX37-14U turbojet in 1977, this basic engine advanced only to the prototype stage.
The lack of sophisticated testing facilities in India hampered progress, and GTRE was suddenly tasked with developing a modern turbofan engine—demanding cutting-edge materials, advanced technology and constant, accountable effort.
Resources were limited and experience was lacking. So what GTRE could do was try and deliver whatever possible. That’s not how challenges in the aviation industry are met.
LACK OF TECH EXPERTISE
While senior officials at GTRE and DRDO were aware of their limited expertise, no early efforts were made to acquire foreign technology or pursue international collaboration.
The reluctance to seek outside assistance caused years of unnecessary delay. Just one example will be sufficient to cement this. When no light was visible at the end of the tunnel, India approached France’s Snecma (now Safran) for technical help only in 2008, after 22 years of futile efforts and spending over Rs 1,500 crore of taxpayers’ money.
Even then, bureaucratic hurdles led to a two-year wait to sign a formal agreement and actual collaboration finally began in 2016. Moreover, India’s licence raj obstructed private sector engagement, delaying essential infrastructure development. It wasn’t until 2020—three and a half decades later—that meaningful private partnership began.
CHANGING REQUIREMENTS
Kaveri was designed to power the Tejas fighter, then under development. But as Tejas’ designs changed, so did engine requirements. Initial specifications called for 52 kilonewton (kN) dry thrust and 81kN afterburner thrust with the engine weight of 1,100 kg.
By the turn of the century, Tejas grew heavier by 1,000 kg, demanding over 90 kN of wet thrust while GTRE’s prototypes fell short, yielding only 49-51kN dry and 70-75kN wet thrust.
Meanwhile, rapidly advancing technology prompted the air force to demand additional features like full authority digital engine control, low-infrared signatures, super-cruise capability, advanced turbine blades, thrust-vectoring nozzles and improved safety.
Unable to meet the original objectives, GTRE eventually shifted its focus to new variants that are proposed to power future advanced medium combat aircraft (AMCA), some of the marine applications and indigenous unmanned systems.
SCARCITY OF MATERIALS & FACILITIES
Producing cutting-edge engines requires superalloys and specialised materials, areas in which DRDO and GTRE lacked expertise. Sourcing these materials was complicated by government inertia and the sanctions imposed on India after the 1998 nuclear tests.
By the time the sanctions eased, crucial years had already slipped by. Testing also posed a major obstacle as India lacked high-altitude testbeds, wind tunnels and stress-testing labs.
These could have been developed over time, but we failed. As a result, even today, India relies on foreign facilities for engine testing and is sending its engines to Russia or elsewhere.
DEFICIT OF WILL
India’s political instability between 1989 and 2004, marked by repeated coalition governments, deeply affected the indigenous engine project.
Even after relative stability returned, official neglect persisted and accountability was rare. The issue simply was not prioritised. India, which is surrounded by formidable adversaries on all sides, should have treated national security with utmost seriousness, but political inertia and babudom consistently stifled progress.
The Kaveri story is now sliding into history, leaving behind hard-earned lessons. For self-reliance, strategic leverage, cost efficiency and globalcompetitiveness, India must urgently develop its own jet engine.
While private participation has begun—with firms like Godrej developing dry variants for unmanned aerial vehicles—what’s needed is national will and a robust partnership between academia, industry and government. State-of-the-art testing, advanced metallurgy and research ecosystems are vital if India hopes to power its next-generation fighter within a desired timeframe.
India faces real threats. China spends nearly 3.7% of its GDP on defence, while Pakistan allocates 2.8%. India, confronting multi-pronged security challenges, lags at just 1.9%—far short of the recommended 3-3.5%. The time has come for the government to prioritise defence spending, move beyond populist measures, enforce accountability and foster broad collaboration.
The Kaveri experience must serve not as a setback, but as a springboard for a new era of innovation, capability and pride. This transformative journey demands a long-term commitment not only from the government, but also from industry leaders, engineers and academia across the nation.
By fostering world-class research, investing in advanced manufacturing and encouraging collaboration at every level, India has the potential to achieve true technological independence under tight timelines. With unwavering national will and strategic focus, we can witness Indian fighter aircraft propelled by engines built entirely at home, marking a breakthrough in both national security and global prestige.
Views are personal
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this column are that of the writer. The facts and opinions expressed here do not reflect the views of www.economictimes.com)
Since the ambitious launch of the Kaveri engine programme in 1986, India has faced repeated setbacks— lost decades, wasted resources and unfulfilled national ambitions.
There is now some momentum to change that. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has said at ET World Leaders Forum that India’s indigenously built fifth-generation fighter aircraft will have indigenously built engines. The plan is to jointly develop them with the French company Safran.
About time too. Originally slated for completion in 1996, the Kaveri project remains unfinished, with its objectives frequently shifting toward secondary applications rather than its initial purpose.
The cost escalation is staggering. What began with an allocation of Rs 382 crore in 1986 ballooned to more than Rs 1,300 crore by 2004, surpassed Rs 2,000 crore by 2014, and officially totalled Rs 2,839 crore by 2016—as acknowledged by the then defence minister Manohar Parrikar in the Lok Sabha. Today, it is estimated that over Rs 3,000 crore has been invested, yet India remains without a homegrown operational engine for its fighter aircraft.
Jet engine is the heart of any aircraft as its mission and performance hinge on this singular technology. Despite years of relentless effort from the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and its Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE),
India has not produced an engine capable of powering its own Tejas multirole aircraft. Our inability to deliver on this promise has not only resulted in prolonged delays but has also dealt a serious blow to national security. There are various factors that contributed to the programme’s persistent failures.
LIMITED EXPERIENCE
When GTRE received the mandate to build an advanced jet engine, its prior experience was minimal. Though it developed the GTX37-14U turbojet in 1977, this basic engine advanced only to the prototype stage.
The lack of sophisticated testing facilities in India hampered progress, and GTRE was suddenly tasked with developing a modern turbofan engine—demanding cutting-edge materials, advanced technology and constant, accountable effort.
Resources were limited and experience was lacking. So what GTRE could do was try and deliver whatever possible. That’s not how challenges in the aviation industry are met.
LACK OF TECH EXPERTISE
While senior officials at GTRE and DRDO were aware of their limited expertise, no early efforts were made to acquire foreign technology or pursue international collaboration.
The reluctance to seek outside assistance caused years of unnecessary delay. Just one example will be sufficient to cement this. When no light was visible at the end of the tunnel, India approached France’s Snecma (now Safran) for technical help only in 2008, after 22 years of futile efforts and spending over Rs 1,500 crore of taxpayers’ money.
Even then, bureaucratic hurdles led to a two-year wait to sign a formal agreement and actual collaboration finally began in 2016. Moreover, India’s licence raj obstructed private sector engagement, delaying essential infrastructure development. It wasn’t until 2020—three and a half decades later—that meaningful private partnership began.
CHANGING REQUIREMENTS
Kaveri was designed to power the Tejas fighter, then under development. But as Tejas’ designs changed, so did engine requirements. Initial specifications called for 52 kilonewton (kN) dry thrust and 81kN afterburner thrust with the engine weight of 1,100 kg.
By the turn of the century, Tejas grew heavier by 1,000 kg, demanding over 90 kN of wet thrust while GTRE’s prototypes fell short, yielding only 49-51kN dry and 70-75kN wet thrust.
Meanwhile, rapidly advancing technology prompted the air force to demand additional features like full authority digital engine control, low-infrared signatures, super-cruise capability, advanced turbine blades, thrust-vectoring nozzles and improved safety.
Unable to meet the original objectives, GTRE eventually shifted its focus to new variants that are proposed to power future advanced medium combat aircraft (AMCA), some of the marine applications and indigenous unmanned systems.
SCARCITY OF MATERIALS & FACILITIES
Producing cutting-edge engines requires superalloys and specialised materials, areas in which DRDO and GTRE lacked expertise. Sourcing these materials was complicated by government inertia and the sanctions imposed on India after the 1998 nuclear tests.
By the time the sanctions eased, crucial years had already slipped by. Testing also posed a major obstacle as India lacked high-altitude testbeds, wind tunnels and stress-testing labs.
These could have been developed over time, but we failed. As a result, even today, India relies on foreign facilities for engine testing and is sending its engines to Russia or elsewhere.
DEFICIT OF WILL
India’s political instability between 1989 and 2004, marked by repeated coalition governments, deeply affected the indigenous engine project.
Even after relative stability returned, official neglect persisted and accountability was rare. The issue simply was not prioritised. India, which is surrounded by formidable adversaries on all sides, should have treated national security with utmost seriousness, but political inertia and babudom consistently stifled progress.
The Kaveri story is now sliding into history, leaving behind hard-earned lessons. For self-reliance, strategic leverage, cost efficiency and globalcompetitiveness, India must urgently develop its own jet engine.
While private participation has begun—with firms like Godrej developing dry variants for unmanned aerial vehicles—what’s needed is national will and a robust partnership between academia, industry and government. State-of-the-art testing, advanced metallurgy and research ecosystems are vital if India hopes to power its next-generation fighter within a desired timeframe.
India faces real threats. China spends nearly 3.7% of its GDP on defence, while Pakistan allocates 2.8%. India, confronting multi-pronged security challenges, lags at just 1.9%—far short of the recommended 3-3.5%. The time has come for the government to prioritise defence spending, move beyond populist measures, enforce accountability and foster broad collaboration.
The Kaveri experience must serve not as a setback, but as a springboard for a new era of innovation, capability and pride. This transformative journey demands a long-term commitment not only from the government, but also from industry leaders, engineers and academia across the nation.
By fostering world-class research, investing in advanced manufacturing and encouraging collaboration at every level, India has the potential to achieve true technological independence under tight timelines. With unwavering national will and strategic focus, we can witness Indian fighter aircraft propelled by engines built entirely at home, marking a breakthrough in both national security and global prestige.
Views are personal
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this column are that of the writer. The facts and opinions expressed here do not reflect the views of www.economictimes.com)
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