Pilot's final words before jet carrying 146 holidaymakers crashed into a mountain in Tenerife

Tenerife is a top holiday destination for Brits seeking sun, sea and sand.

However, on 22nd March 1977, a horrific tragedy occurred when a passenger flight heading to Tenerife North airport, then known as Los Rodeos Airport, crashed, resulting in the death of all 583 people on board.

Tenerife has two airports, but Tenerife North is notoriously challenging for pilots due to its altitude of 2,000ft. This, coupled with weather conditions such as cloud cover, can make visibility particularly difficult.

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Tragedy struck again just three years after the 1977 disaster. At 9.20am on 25th April 1980, Dan-Air's Flight 1008 left Manchester Airport bound for Tenerife.

The plane was mainly filled with British holidaymakers eager to enjoy the sunny beaches and beautiful landscapes of the Canary Islands, reports the Daily Record.

The flight crew included three seasoned pilots - Captain Arthur Whelan, 50, co-pilot First Officer Michael Firth, 33, and flight engineer Raymond Carey, 33. Along with them were five flight attendants, making the total number of passengers and crew on board 146.

For three hours, the flight went smoothly until the crew began their descent at 1pm local time.

Gale-force winds from an unexpected quarter meant flights were rerouted to Runway 12, causing a headache for air traffic controller Justo Camin, 34. With another aircraft already homing in on the same strip, the risk of a mid-air collision loomed large.

Lacking radar support, Camin had to fall back on old-school tactics, directing each flight along a set path. At 1:18 pm, he realised the Dan Air crew needed to circle to give the preceding plane space to touch down safely on Runway 12.

But with no standard holding pattern for that runway, Camin had to think on his feet. He told Flight 1008 to maintain a left-hand circuit, looping until the coast was clear.

Camin radioed First Officer Firth, "Roger, the er, standard holding pattern overhead Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly."

Captain Whelan's response was a terse "Roger", neglecting to echo Camin's directive—a move that might have prevented the looming tragedy.

Yet when Camin said "turn to the left," he meant to signal continuous left turns, not a single leftward manoeuvre. This critical miscommunication led the crew to make a fatal error in judgement.

Camin, who had originally cleared the flight for an altitude of 5,000 feet, made a seemingly minor but critical error.

Captain Whelan, baffled by the unexpected directive to maintain a holding pattern absent from his charts, instinctively made a left-hand turn to a heading of 150 degrees, believing that this was what the controller intended.

Flying over mountainous regions where the minimum safe altitude was pegged at 14,500 feet posed a grave risk for their safety.

Barely a minute and six seconds prior to the tragedy, one pilot remarked, "bloody strange hold, isn't it?" and noted that it didn't align with the runway in any way.

The cockpit voice recorder captured the crew's escalating concern, but no one challenged the instructions from control.

Believing the aircraft to be safely over water following his impromptu holding pattern, Controller Camin approved a further descent of 1,000 feet, unbeknownst to him that the plane was dangerously nestled among the peaks.

In the face of uncertain orders from Camin, Captain Whelan admitted to his co-pilot, "I don't like that."

His co-pilot queried, moving deeper into confusion, "they want us to keep going more round, don't they?".

It was then that the automated ground proximity warning system blared within the cockpit, spurring them with the command to "pull up, pull up!".

In a last-ditch effort to avoid disaster, Captain Whelan interrupted his current manoeuvre, sharply veering right instead of continuing leftward, under the impression that it would enable them to skirt the imminent threat.

Upon the alarm sounding, the usual procedure would be to "pull up" to gain enough height to avoid any terrain.

Co-pilot Firth, after examining the chart, realised the captain's choice was misguided and suggested they consider other options.

Flight Engineer Carey's urgent words, "let's get out of here," were captured on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR). Despite Carey's warning, Captain Whelan continued with the sharp right manoeuvre, leading to a drop of 300 feet.

Spanish investigators concluded in their report that this very action sealed the fate of the aircraft, eliminating any chance of escaping the calamity.

The final chilling words from Flight Engineer Carey, "bank angle, bank angle!" were recorded before the CVR fell silent.

Dan-Air Flight 1008 met its catastrophic fate as it collided with La Esperanza at an altitude of 5,450 feet, just 92 feet (28 metres) below the summit.

The impact obliterated most of the plane instantly, with wreckage strewn down the mountainside. The tail section was flung hundreds of metres further, finally coming to rest in a ravine where it broke apart.

Small fires broke out amidst the scattered debris, and Tenerife North Airport was jolted by the crash alarm for the second time in just over three years. Rescue teams arrived at the mountain within hours, but it was immediately apparent that none of the 146 passengers on board had survived the crash.

The scene was so horrific not a single intact human body could be found, and many victims couldn't be definitively identified. While acknowledging the air traffic controller's error, Spanish investigators placed all the blame on the Dan Air crew.

However, British investigators argued the controller should have recognised earlier that the closeness of the two planes would cause a problem, allowing him to implement a standard holding pattern and avoid any confusion among the crew.

They further contended the controller shouldn't have issued an untried and non-standard holding pattern, but they admitted the Dan Air crew didn't question the controller's instructions or ask for clarification.

The British team also criticised Camin's decision to allow flight 1008 to descend to 5,000 feet. If the holding pattern had been designed according to official regulations, the minimum altitude should have been set at 7,000 feet.

Receiving a ground proximity warning, the captain, who was unable to see due to dense fog and cloud, decided to turn right. However, this decision led to the plane crashing directly into the mountain.

In this critical moment, the standard procedure for pilots would have been to climb to a higher altitude.

A single missing letter in one word ultimately led to the chain of events culminating in the tragic crash.

Crucially, the controller's use of "turn" instead of "turns" was pivotal in causing the tragic crash.

Following the accident, the investigation brought to light the critical need for explicit and standardised communication across all aspects of flight. This included procedures for holding patterns.

The incident demonstrated the importance of precise communication between pilots and air traffic controllers. To prevent misunderstandings, pilots needed to reiterate the instructions provided by air traffic controllers.

Despite the catastrophe, the airline, Dan Air, was able to bounce back, continuing to operate until its eventual acquisition by British Airways in 1992.

Sadly, although this incident claimed the most lives in the history of a British aircraft, the memory of the tragic loss of 146 lives on Dan Air Flight 1008 seems to have faded away over the past four and a half decades.